Capacities, Universality, and Singularity

Capacities, Universality, and Singularity

In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy of science 1997-12, Vol.64 (4), p.605-626
1. Verfasser: Glennan, Stuart S.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Ascriptions
Causal law
Causality
Causation
Electrons
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Metaphysics
Natural law
Philosophy
Physical theory
Science
Theory
Thrombosis
Universality
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/392574