Relief aid stocking decisions under bilateral agency cooperation

We aim to quantify the benefits of cooperation between humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stocking decisions. We consider two agencies that stock the same type of relief item at different locations prone to individual disaster risks and agree to transship the shortage amount from available stocks in case of a disaster. We incorporate the disaster risk to the Newsvendor model by conditioning the stock quantity decisions on the event that a major disaster occurs within the lifetime of the stocked relief item. We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity and compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically. We apply this game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul to optimize the stocking decisions of an agency for shelter units in cooperation with another agency. We investigate the characteristics of the solutions under various parameter settings and identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies. •We model cooperation between two humanitarian relief agencies in terms of stock transfers in case of shortage.•We optimize the stock quantity for each agency in response to the other's quantity.•We compute a Nash Equilibrium solution numerically.•We apply the game theoretic approach to the case of earthquake preparedness in Istanbul.•We identify cases in which cooperation may be beneficial to one or both of the agencies.