Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ

Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation, even while providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries . This is especially the case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over slow networks...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of cryptology 2019-07, Vol.32 (3), p.1026-1069
Hauptverfasser: Lindell, Yehuda, Pinkas, Benny, Smart, Nigel P., Yanai, Avishay
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation, even while providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries . This is especially the case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over slow networks. However, in the multi-party setting, all concretely efficient fully secure protocols, such as SPDZ, require many rounds of communication. In this paper, we present a constant-round multi-party secure computation protocol that is fully secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and for any number of corrupted parties. Our construction is based on the constant-round protocol of Beaver et al. (the BMR protocol) and is the first version of that protocol that is concretely efficient for the dishonest majority case. Our protocol includes an online phase that is extremely fast and mainly consists of each party locally evaluating a garbled circuit. For the offline phase, we present both a generic construction (using any underlying MPC protocol) and a highly efficient instantiation based on the SPDZ protocol. Our estimates show the protocol to be considerably more efficient than previous fully secure multi-party protocols.
ISSN:0933-2790
1432-1378
DOI:10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2