Rage against the machines: How subjects play against learning algorithms

We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learnin...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic theory 2010-06, Vol.43 (3), p.407-430
Hauptverfasser: Duersch, Peter, Kolb, Albert, Oechssler, Jörg, Schipper, Burkhard C
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects' performances depend on their opponents' learning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-009-0446-0