Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment
King investigates the judicial parties' ability to circumvent consistency by bargaining around the rules that structure sentences within statutory ranges. Without careful control by judges, sentencing bargaining carries risks for structured-sentencing systems that may outweigh gains in efficien...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Stanford law review 2005-10, Vol.58 (1), p.293-308 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | King investigates the judicial parties' ability to circumvent consistency by bargaining around the rules that structure sentences within statutory ranges. Without careful control by judges, sentencing bargaining carries risks for structured-sentencing systems that may outweigh gains in efficiency. She advances by discussing several options that would strengthen judges' supervisory role, promoting greater accuracy, transparency, and consistency in federal sentencing. |
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ISSN: | 0038-9765 1939-8581 |