Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So

Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So

According to all varieties of virtue reliabilism, knowledge is always gained through the exercise of epistemic competences. These competences can be conceived as competences to form true beliefs, or as competences to know. I will present a short but decisive argument against the idea that knowledge...

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Veröffentlicht in:Thought (Hoboken, N.J.) N.J.), 2019-06, Vol.8 (2), p.110-118
1. Verfasser: Hirvelä, Jaakko
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Christoph Kelp
competence
Epistemology
knowledge‐first epistemology
Lisa Miracchi
Morality
virtue epistemology
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Zusammenfassung:According to all varieties of virtue reliabilism, knowledge is always gained through the exercise of epistemic competences. These competences can be conceived as competences to form true beliefs, or as competences to know. I will present a short but decisive argument against the idea that knowledge is always gained through the exercise of competences to know. The competence to know isn't necessary for gaining knowledge.
ISSN:2161-2234
2161-2234
DOI:10.1002/tht3.411