The Violence of Persuasive Argument: Using Durkheim to Outline a Latent Barrier to a Nonviolent Criminology

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of a form of violence that represents a potential barrier to the development of a nonviolent criminology. Using several contentions drawn from Emile Durkheim’s theory of crime and punishment, it is proposed that persuasive arguments entail a component of violence where they contradict strong collective sentiments. The general nature and normality of this form of violence are outlined. In addition, it is suggested that although neglect of this violence may allow progressive researchers to maintain nonviolent self-conceptions, such neglect also may serve the interests of “intellectuals” while undermining the power of “nonintellectuals.” The violence of persuasive argument thus constitutes a problematic paradox for scholars who embrace nonviolence and equitable distributions of power.