The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe

Legal constitutionalism – Political constitutionalism – Emergence of illiberal constitutionalism as a tertium genus – Examination of constitutional courts under three illiberal governments: Poland, Hungary, and Turkey – Illiberal governments’ strategies to seize control of constitutional courts – Il...

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Veröffentlicht in:European constitutional law review 2019-03, Vol.15 (1), p.48-72
1. Verfasser: Castillo-Ortiz, Pablo
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Legal constitutionalism – Political constitutionalism – Emergence of illiberal constitutionalism as a tertium genus – Examination of constitutional courts under three illiberal governments: Poland, Hungary, and Turkey – Illiberal governments’ strategies to seize control of constitutional courts – Illiberal governments’ aim to secure leverage over constitutional judges and restrict the powers of review of the court – Constitutional courts under illiberal rule invert the traditional functions that were assigned to them under the original Kelsenian approach – Instead of a check on power, illiberal constitutional courts become a device to circumvent constitutional constraints and concentrate power in the hands of the ruling actors.
ISSN:1574-0196
1744-5515
DOI:10.1017/S1574019619000026