MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOLIDARISM

According to Scheler, different from the various universalism theories, value-personalism possesses a requirement that any philosophical sociology or socio-political ethics must meet. [...]the "collective person" is merely the opposite of the "single person [Einzelperson]" and there is one individual "collective person" just as there are individual "single persons". According to Scheler, the person-community is one made up by persons proper, embracing both the individual person and the collective person, whereas the two pure forms of the collective person are the cultural and religious collective persons respectively, the former corresponding to spiritual value, the latter to absolute value which, as a result, makes it hard to say that a person community purely corresponds to absolute value. [...]what makes it necessary is the formal proposition concerning the essential opposition or reciprocity and opposite or reciprocal values of all morally relevant comportment, viz., the aforementioned phenomenological essence of "essential social acts" and the essence of their corresponding (reciprocal) value constitute the necessary foundation of the principle of solidarity.32 On this ground, "solidarism" or "the principle of solidarity" is in essence a principle of "meta" thinking of phenomenology rather than a positive socio-political theory.33 Translated from the Chinese original by Lin Zhang 1 This article is funded by the Major project of the National Social Science Fund of China (NSSFC) (Project No.: 17ZDA033) and the Project supported by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation of PR China (FANEDD) 2013 (Grant No. 201403).