Higher Member Bank Reserve Ratios in 1936 and 1937 Did Not Cause the Relapse into Depression
Examination of both sides of member banks' balance sheets reveals evidence that refutes the claim that higher member bank reserve ratios imposed by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1936 and 1937 caused the relapse of the U.S. economy into depression. Member banks responded to higher re...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of post Keynesian economics 2001-12, Vol.24 (2), p.205-216 |
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| container_end_page | 216 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
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| container_title | Journal of post Keynesian economics |
| container_volume | 24 |
| creator | Telser, L. G. |
| description | Examination of both sides of member banks' balance sheets reveals evidence that refutes the claim that higher member bank reserve ratios imposed by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1936 and 1937 caused the relapse of the U.S. economy into depression. Member banks responded to higher reserves by selling some of their U.S. Treasury paper and did not reduce their loans to business. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/01603477.2001.11490323 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0160-3477 |
| ispartof | Journal of post Keynesian economics, 2001-12, Vol.24 (2), p.205-216 |
| issn | 0160-3477 1557-7821 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_219146457 |
| source | Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Balance sheets Bank assets Bank liabilities Bank loans Bank reserve ratios Business holdings Checking accounts Economic impact Federal Reserve Bank Federal Reserve monetary policy Federal Reserve Policy Government securities Great Depression History Money supply Statistical analysis Studies |
| title | Higher Member Bank Reserve Ratios in 1936 and 1937 Did Not Cause the Relapse into Depression |
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