Higher Member Bank Reserve Ratios in 1936 and 1937 Did Not Cause the Relapse into Depression

Higher Member Bank Reserve Ratios in 1936 and 1937 Did Not Cause the Relapse into Depression

Examination of both sides of member banks' balance sheets reveals evidence that refutes the claim that higher member bank reserve ratios imposed by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1936 and 1937 caused the relapse of the U.S. economy into depression. Member banks responded to higher re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of post Keynesian economics 2001-12, Vol.24 (2), p.205-216
1. Verfasser: Telser, L. G.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Balance sheets
Bank assets
Bank liabilities
Bank loans
Bank reserve ratios
Business holdings
Checking accounts
Economic impact
Federal Reserve Bank
Federal Reserve monetary policy
Federal Reserve Policy
Government securities
Great Depression
History
Money supply
Statistical analysis
Studies
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Zusammenfassung:Examination of both sides of member banks' balance sheets reveals evidence that refutes the claim that higher member bank reserve ratios imposed by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1936 and 1937 caused the relapse of the U.S. economy into depression. Member banks responded to higher reserves by selling some of their U.S. Treasury paper and did not reduce their loans to business.
ISSN:0160-3477
1557-7821
DOI:10.1080/01603477.2001.11490323