THE MERITS OF EUDAIMONISM

This paper starts with Immanuel Kant's definition of "eudaimonism" (a term he created) as a single-source account of motivation, and explains why he thinks the eudaimonist is unacceptably self-regarding. In order to modify and improve Kant's account, the paper then revisits the Christian scholastics. Scotus is distinguished from Aquinas on the grounds that Scotus has a more robust conception of the will that encompasses the ranking of the affection for advantage (for the agent's happiness and perfection) and the affection for justice (for what is good in itself, independent of this relation to the agent). This is a double-source account of motivation. With these conceptual resources in hand, the paper goes on to examine Jean Porter's defense of eudaimonism, urging that she begs the question against the Scotist view. Finally, the paper makes a conciliating suggestion that preserves most, but not all, of what the eudaimonist wants.