Stopping to Reflect
Through a sequence of examples, a recent article by Frank Arntzenius, "Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection," purports to show limitations for a combination of two inductive principles that relate current and future rational degrees of belief. Schervish et al. contend that n...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of philosophy 2004-06, Vol.101 (6), p.315-322 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Through a sequence of examples, a recent article by Frank Arntzenius, "Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection," purports to show limitations for a combination of two inductive principles that relate current and future rational degrees of belief. Schervish et al. contend that neither of these principles is mandatory for a rational agent. |
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ISSN: | 0022-362X 1939-8549 |
DOI: | 10.5840/jphil2004101614 |