On symmetric linear games
In this paper, we generalize classical von Neumann symmetrization of two-person zero-sum games to general linear games. We use this symmetrization to show that for a given general linear game there exists a symmetric linear game whose solution yields a solution to the underlying linear game. We defi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Linear algebra and its applications 2019-02, Vol.562, p.44-54 |
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| container_title | Linear algebra and its applications |
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| creator | Gokulraj, S. Chandrashekaran, A. |
| description | In this paper, we generalize classical von Neumann symmetrization of two-person zero-sum games to general linear games. We use this symmetrization to show that for a given general linear game there exists a symmetric linear game whose solution yields a solution to the underlying linear game. We define symmetric linear games of type gRPS (generalized Rock–Paper–Scissors) and prove that a symmetric linear game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a gRPS game. From this we deduce that a completely mixed symmetric linear game is gRPS. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.laa.2018.10.004 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Linear algebra and its applications, 2019-02, Vol.562, p.44-54 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals |
| subjects | Economic models Game theory Games Linear algebra Pure equilibrium Rock–Paper–Scissors game Symmetric two-player game Zero sum games Zero-sum linear game |
| title | On symmetric linear games |
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