Economics of the Right-to-Work Controversy: A Comment

Economics of the Right-to-Work Controversy: A Comment

In a recent article Lowell E. Gallaway has argued that some conclusions can be derived from economic models of trade union behavior regarding the economic efficiency of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley amendments, which permit state laws to outlaw closed shop and union shop agreements.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Southern economic journal 1967-01, Vol.33 (3), p.411-415
Hauptverfasser: Peterson, John M., Spriggs, Darrell L.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Bargaining
Closed shops
Communications
Demand curves
Economic models
Economics
Employment
Kinked demand
Labor supply
Labor unions
Membership functions
Nonunion
Right to work
Supply
Supply curves
Unemployment
Union security clauses
Union shops
Wage rates
Wages
Wages & salaries
Workers
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In a recent article Lowell E. Gallaway has argued that some conclusions can be derived from economic models of trade union behavior regarding the economic efficiency of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley amendments, which permit state laws to outlaw closed shop and union shop agreements.
ISSN:0038-4038
2325-8012
DOI:10.2307/1055124