Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap

Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap

Block expresses concern with the relation between the claim that there is an unclosable gap as a result of the fundamental nature of consciousness and the claim that there is no conceptual analysis of consciousness in functional or physical terms. It is argued that the lack of a conceptual analysis...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Philosophical review 1999-01, Vol.108 (1), p.1-46
Hauptverfasser: Block, Ned, Stalnaker, Robert
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
A priori knowledge
Conceptual analysis
Consciousness
Intensionality
Liquids
Metaphysics
Microphysics
Modal realism
Philosophy
Physicalism
Physics
Theory
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Zusammenfassung:Block expresses concern with the relation between the claim that there is an unclosable gap as a result of the fundamental nature of consciousness and the claim that there is no conceptual analysis of consciousness in functional or physical terms. It is argued that the lack of a conceptual analysis of consciousness entails dualism.
ISSN:0031-8108
1558-1470
DOI:10.2307/2998259