The U.S. Securitization of the 1992 Consensus -Security Speech Acts and Threat Inflation, 2011-2012
During 2011-2012, the "1992 Consensus" was understood as relating to the cross-Strait security situation. Yet, I argue that the 1992 Consensus was not intrinsically a security problem but rather became one through U.S. acts of securitization. While the 1992 Consensus was originally seen as a politic...
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Veröffentlicht in: | EurAmerica 2018-09, Vol.48 (3), p.387-427 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | chi ; eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | During 2011-2012, the "1992 Consensus" was understood as relating to the cross-Strait security situation. Yet, I argue that the 1992 Consensus was not intrinsically a security problem but rather became one through U.S. acts of securitization. While the 1992 Consensus was originally seen as a political issue, the United States brought a security logic to bear on it by arguing that cross-Strait relations would likely become unstable should the 1992 Consensus be denied. As a result of the issue linkage or rhetorical framing, what once had been a political formula came to be understood in Taiwan as a security issue. I also argue that the U.S. securitization of the 1992 Consensus was a discursive practice that inflated Chinese threats to Taiwan. A comparative-historical analysis reveals that what causes cross-Strait tensions is Taipei's adoption of pro-independence policies that provoke China rather than Taipei's rejection of the 1992 Consensus. |
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ISSN: | 1021-3058 1991-7864 |
DOI: | 10.7015/JEAS.201809_48(3).0002 |