LEGAL ACADEMIC BACKLASH: THE RESPONSE OF LEGAL THEORISTS TO SITUATIONIST INSIGHTS
Conditions Encouraging Naive Cynicism Based on what we described in the Great Attributional Divide as the interior sources of dispositionism,10 we predicted that naïve cynicism will be enhanced with respect to a particular policy question when the situationist attributions (1) involve settings with...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Emory law journal 2008-08, Vol.57 (5), p.1087 |
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Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Conditions Encouraging Naive Cynicism Based on what we described in the Great Attributional Divide as the interior sources of dispositionism,10 we predicted that naïve cynicism will be enhanced with respect to a particular policy question when the situationist attributions (1) involve settings with particularly salient actors who appear to be making particularly clear choices; (2) are complex or counterintuitive; (3) fail to provide clear answers or cognitive closure; (4) are made by-or otherwise involve-outgroup members; (5) threaten our conceptions of ourselves or the groups with which we identify; and/or (6) threaten the legitimacy of larger systems (or arise during periods when the system is threatened generally).11 Each of those factors will likely contribute to naive cynicism because each encourages dispositionism, amplifying the motives behind naive cynicism. 2. [...] the narrative of high-minded engagement and the inevitable triumph of the meritorious theory is, in significant part, a myth.219 The naïve cynical process seems to be shaping policies more than the cold hard data are.220 Social psychology has struggled for acceptance within the legal academy, not because the insights of the field lack merit but because social psychology tells us things about ourselves that seem wrong, uncomfortable, and threatening, engendering a strong backlash. |
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ISSN: | 0094-4076 2163-324X |