Some experimental evidence regarding collusion
A study examined experimentally generated examples of overt and tacit collusion. The experimental environment was based on a model developed by Morrison (1979), which accommodates any number of rivals and has 3 solutions: zero profit, Cournot-Nash, and collusion. The experiments involved subjects se...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Atlantic economic journal 1990-06, Vol.18 (2), p.27-36 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | A study examined experimentally generated examples of overt and tacit collusion. The experimental environment was based on a model developed by Morrison (1979), which accommodates any number of rivals and has 3 solutions: zero profit, Cournot-Nash, and collusion. The experiments involved subjects serving as chief executive officers of rival firms. Overt collusion was observed in a series of experiments involving masters of business administration (MBA) students at Indiana University. The interviews and experiments presented a variety of motives and actions. Tacit collusion experiments were conducted with 4 MBA students at the University of Notre Dame. No indication of tacit collusion was found with 3 or more rivals. However, a variety of tacit collusions was observed with 2 rivals and high markups. |
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ISSN: | 0197-4254 1573-9678 |
DOI: | 10.1007/BF02313366 |