Transparency in monetary policy
The paper examines different aspects of transparency. Transparency serves democratic accountability by promoting public control. Specifically, the degree of transparency conditions inflation expectations, hence the central bank's scope for stabilization. Recent studies have put doubt on the not...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Atlantic economic journal 2002-12, Vol.30 (4), p.353-365 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | The paper examines different aspects of transparency. Transparency serves democratic accountability by promoting public control. Specifically, the degree of transparency conditions inflation expectations, hence the central bank's scope for stabilization. Recent studies have put doubt on the notion that complete transparency is socially desirable. Here it is pointed out that the conclusion critically depends on an asymmetric modelling of stochastic preferences. The paper also reviews the pros and cons of revealing individual voting. A conclusion is that secrecy is to be prefered in monetary unions in order to shield governors from pressure by home governments. |
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ISSN: | 0197-4254 1573-9678 |
DOI: | 10.1007/BF02298778 |