A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes

A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes

IT IS well known that the method of simple majority decision may lead to intransitive group preferences even though the preferences of the individuals in the group are transitive. In this paper it is shown that any preference pattern whatsoever can be arrived at by simple majority decision of indivi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Econometrica 1953-10, Vol.21 (4), p.608-610
1. Verfasser: McGarvey, David C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Paradoxes
Preferences
Voting paradox
Voting patterns
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description IT IS well known that the method of simple majority decision may lead to intransitive group preferences even though the preferences of the individuals in the group are transitive. In this paper it is shown that any preference pattern whatsoever can be arrived at by simple majority decision of individuals with strong transitive preferences.
doi_str_mv 10.2307/1907926
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subjects Paradoxes
Preferences
Voting paradox
Voting patterns
title A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes
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