A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes

IT IS well known that the method of simple majority decision may lead to intransitive group preferences even though the preferences of the individuals in the group are transitive. In this paper it is shown that any preference pattern whatsoever can be arrived at by simple majority decision of indivi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Econometrica 1953-10, Vol.21 (4), p.608-610
1. Verfasser: McGarvey, David C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:IT IS well known that the method of simple majority decision may lead to intransitive group preferences even though the preferences of the individuals in the group are transitive. In this paper it is shown that any preference pattern whatsoever can be arrived at by simple majority decision of individuals with strong transitive preferences.
ISSN:0012-9682
1468-0262
DOI:10.2307/1907926