A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
This file contains two sets of calculations. First, we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of Proposition 1. Second, the mixing probabilities of Proposition 1 are shown to be well defined.
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 2004-06, Vol.116 (2), p.294,1-322,14 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This file contains two sets of calculations. First, we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of Proposition 1. Second, the mixing probabilities of Proposition 1 are shown to be well defined. |
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ISSN: | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00259-X |