How to Make Scientists Agree: An Evolutionary Betting Mechanism

How to Make Scientists Agree: An Evolutionary Betting Mechanism

One of the basic problems in giving economic advice is to find sufficiently robust empirical evidence for making policy recommendations. Since there are no "objective" ways to decide on the "truth" of scientific results, social sciences have resorted to some method of "tempo...

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Veröffentlicht in:Kyklos (Basel) 2000-01, Vol.53 (4), p.587-592
1. Verfasser: Slembeck, Tilman
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Cooperation
Economics
Experts
Information
Policy making
Scientists
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description One of the basic problems in giving economic advice is to find sufficiently robust empirical evidence for making policy recommendations. Since there are no "objective" ways to decide on the "truth" of scientific results, social sciences have resorted to some method of "temporary consensus," which has lead to various schools of thought involving scholars that agree upon certain views, assumptions and methods. Slembeck outlines a basic mechanism that may help to bridge some of the disagreement between schools.
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source RePEc; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online
subjects Cooperation
Economics
Experts
Information
Policy making
Scientists
title How to Make Scientists Agree: An Evolutionary Betting Mechanism
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