Synchronous and lagged relationships between CEO pay and performance of quality companies

Purpose - This paper aims to examine the synchronous and lagged relationships between CEOs' pay and the performance of a group of public companies that had won a very prestigious award: the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA).Design methodology approach - This study uses three rates...

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Veröffentlicht in:Managerial finance 2008-07, Vol.34 (8), p.555-561
1. Verfasser: Tai, Lawrence S
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Purpose - This paper aims to examine the synchronous and lagged relationships between CEOs' pay and the performance of a group of public companies that had won a very prestigious award: the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA).Design methodology approach - This study uses three rates of return to represent firm performance: return on assets, return on equity and holding period return. Regression analysis is used to determine the direction of causality between CEO pay and firm performance and the existence of lagged relationship between them.Findings - The findings indicate the existence of synchronous and lagged relationships between CEO pay and firm performance. However, the direction of causality is mainly from pay to performance, and not vice versa.Research limitations implications - The results presented in this paper are limited by the small sample size of MBNQA winning companies. Although the award began in 1988, only a few companies won the award each year and many of them were not public companies. In addition, five companies won the award twice and one company won the award three times, which further reduces the sample size.Originality value - This paper finds the existence of synchronous and lagged relationships between CEO pay and firm performance for a group of quality companies.
ISSN:0307-4358
1758-7743
DOI:10.1108/03074350810874073