The Interest Cost Implications of the Financial Advisor Turned Underwriter
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) does not prohibit municipal financial advisors from participating in the bidding process to serve as underwriter on issues for which they provided advisory services. Some municipalities prohibit the practice, viewing such an arrangement as a conflict...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Public budgeting & finance 1997-09, Vol.17 (3), p.74-86 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) does not prohibit municipal financial advisors from participating in the bidding process to serve as underwriter on issues for which they provided advisory services. Some municipalities prohibit the practice, viewing such an arrangement as a conflict of interest. Using data from nearly one thousand competitively sold municipal debt issues in the state of Texas from 1991 to 1995, I test whether or not competition alone in the bidding process is sufficient to protect the interests of the issuer. For general obligation debt and state‐backed school district debt these data indicate that there are no interest cost implications for the practice. For municipal and special district revenue debt I find weak evidence of some additional interest (about six basis points) when the advisor serves as underwriter, but the effect is not consistent enough throughout the data to reach statistical significance at the p |
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ISSN: | 0275-1100 1540-5850 |
DOI: | 10.1111/1540-5850.01110 |