On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders

In a canonical multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) information can be arbitrarily correlated, (ii) senders reveal information simultaneously, and (iii) send...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2018-09, Vol.170, p.66-70
Hauptverfasser: Li, Fei, Norman, Peter
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:In a canonical multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) information can be arbitrarily correlated, (ii) senders reveal information simultaneously, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper constructs examples that demonstrate that adding senders can result in a loss of information if any of these assumptions is violated.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.023