Tax litigation, tax reporting game, and social costs

A recent study investigates the consequences of tax litigation on the equilibrium behaviors of taxpayers and a tax enforcement agency. The impact of both taxpayer uncertainty and economic factors such as litigation costs, tax rate and audit costs upon the tax agency's revenue collections is exa...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of the American Taxation Association 1995-10, Vol.17 (2), p.1
1. Verfasser: Jung, Woon-Oh
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:A recent study investigates the consequences of tax litigation on the equilibrium behaviors of taxpayers and a tax enforcement agency. The impact of both taxpayer uncertainty and economic factors such as litigation costs, tax rate and audit costs upon the tax agency's revenue collections is examined, along with the frequency of tax trials and an aggregate level of audit and litigation costs. An increase in the taxpayer's litigation costs results in less aggressive reporting behavior, which increases the tax agency's revenue and reduces the aggregate level of audit and litigation costs. The effects of a rise in the tax agency's litigation costs are indeterminate. As the level of taxpayer uncertainty is elevated, the model indicates that there will be fewer tax trials and the aggregate audit and litigation costs will decline.
ISSN:0198-9073
1558-8017