Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of “social preferences.” We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social w...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Quarterly journal of economics 2002-08, Vol.117 (3), p.817-869 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of “social preferences.” We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare—sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients—than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models). Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior. |
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ISSN: | 0033-5533 1531-4650 |
DOI: | 10.1162/003355302760193904 |