Taxes, Redistribution, and the Minimum Wage: A Theoretical Analysis
This paper considers a simple general equilibrium model that contains two types of workers with differing levels of ability and a social-welfare-maximizing government. The paper shows that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing an optimal linear income tax with a minimum wage, bu...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Quarterly journal of economics 1987-08, Vol.102 (3), p.477-489 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper considers a simple general equilibrium model that contains two types of workers with differing levels of ability and a social-welfare-maximizing government. The paper shows that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing an optimal linear income tax with a minimum wage, but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with a minimum wage. |
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ISSN: | 0033-5533 1531-4650 |
DOI: | 10.2307/1884214 |