Managerial myopia and the mortgage meltdown

Prominent policy makers assert that managerial short-termism was at the root of the subprime crisis of 2007–2009. Prior scholarly research, however, largely rejects this assertion. Using a more comprehensive measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives for short-termism, we uncover evidence t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of financial economics 2018-06, Vol.128 (3), p.466-485
Hauptverfasser: Kolasinski, Adam C., Yang, Nan
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Prominent policy makers assert that managerial short-termism was at the root of the subprime crisis of 2007–2009. Prior scholarly research, however, largely rejects this assertion. Using a more comprehensive measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives for short-termism, we uncover evidence that short-termism indeed played a role. Firms whose CEOs were contractually allowed to sell or exercise more of their stock and options holdings sooner had more subprime exposure, a higher probability of financial distress, and lower risk-adjusted stock returns during the crisis, as well as higher fines and settlements for subprime-related fraud.
ISSN:0304-405X
1879-2774
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.03.010