Strengthened Pareto Equilibrium for Games on Intersecting Sets

Strengthened Pareto Equilibrium for Games on Intersecting Sets

A new concept of equilibrium is offered. It can be used to define a fair distribution in cooperative games on intersecting game sets and to refine the hierarchical dependence between known equilibria.

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Veröffentlicht in:Cybernetics and systems analysis 2018-07, Vol.54 (4), p.552-562
1. Verfasser: Smol’yakov, E. R.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Artificial Intelligence
Control
Dependence
Game theory
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Processor Architectures
Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems
Systems Theory
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:A new concept of equilibrium is offered. It can be used to define a fair distribution in cooperative games on intersecting game sets and to refine the hierarchical dependence between known equilibria.
ISSN:1060-0396
1573-8337
DOI:10.1007/s10559-018-0056-6