Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy

Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously p...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2018-03, Vol.164, p.31-34
Hauptverfasser:	Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, Persson, Lars, Tåg, Joacim
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Acquisitions & mergers Antitrust Antitrust policy Buyouts Companies Equity M&As Markets Mergers Owners Private equity Studies Temporary ownership
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

container_end_page	34
container_issue
container_start_page	31
container_title	Economics letters
container_volume	164
creator	Norbäck, Pehr-Johan Persson, Lars Tåg, Joacim
description	Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously privately unprofitable – but consumer surplus-enhancing – mergers now take place. We thus predict that merger waves among incumbents should follow the development of a local PE industry.
doi_str_mv	10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.027
format	Article
fullrecord	<record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2048531025</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0165176517305220</els_id><sourcerecordid>2048531025</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c449t-7ba24e117deaf94bf92dc8c9b93a59b94ffb1d915a4a2911a5169fbd8f3974233</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkE9LAzEQxYMoWKsfQVjwvGsmmzQbL0WK_6Cgh3oO2WyiWeqmJtnCfntT2ruHmYHHezPMD6FbwBVgWNz3ldF-2JpUEQy8AlJhws_QDBpel7zm9BzNso-VwBfsEl3F2GMMRHA2Q8vNdzAqmcENX0XyRTtOD8VHcPusFeZ3dGk6aH5MsVBDlyu5FMaYip3fOj1dowurttHcnOYcfT4_bVav5fr95W31uC41pSKVvFWEGgDeGWUFba0gnW60aEWtWO7U2hY6AUxRRQSAYrAQtu0aWwtOSV3P0d1x7y7439HEJHs_hiGflATThtWACcsudnTp4GMMxspdcD8qTBKwPLCSvTyxkgdWEojMrHJuecyZ_MLemSCjdmbQpnPB6CQ77_7Z8Ad4Z3WI</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2048531025</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy</title><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete</source><creator>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan ; Persson, Lars ; Tåg, Joacim</creator><creatorcontrib>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan ; Persson, Lars ; Tåg, Joacim</creatorcontrib><description>Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously privately unprofitable – but consumer surplus-enhancing – mergers now take place. We thus predict that merger waves among incumbents should follow the development of a local PE industry.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0165-1765</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-7374</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.027</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Acquisitions & mergers ; Antitrust ; Antitrust policy ; Buyouts ; Companies ; Equity ; M&As ; Markets ; Mergers ; Owners ; Private equity ; Studies ; Temporary ownership</subject><ispartof>Economics letters, 2018-03, Vol.164, p.31-34</ispartof><rights>2018 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Mar 2018</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c449t-7ba24e117deaf94bf92dc8c9b93a59b94ffb1d915a4a2911a5169fbd8f3974233</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c449t-7ba24e117deaf94bf92dc8c9b93a59b94ffb1d915a4a2911a5169fbd8f3974233</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.027$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3541,27915,27916,45986</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Persson, Lars</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tåg, Joacim</creatorcontrib><title>Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy</title><title>Economics letters</title><description>Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously privately unprofitable – but consumer surplus-enhancing – mergers now take place. We thus predict that merger waves among incumbents should follow the development of a local PE industry.</description><subject>Acquisitions & mergers</subject><subject>Antitrust</subject><subject>Antitrust policy</subject><subject>Buyouts</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Equity</subject><subject>M&As</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Mergers</subject><subject>Owners</subject><subject>Private equity</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Temporary ownership</subject><issn>0165-1765</issn><issn>1873-7374</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkE9LAzEQxYMoWKsfQVjwvGsmmzQbL0WK_6Cgh3oO2WyiWeqmJtnCfntT2ruHmYHHezPMD6FbwBVgWNz3ldF-2JpUEQy8AlJhws_QDBpel7zm9BzNso-VwBfsEl3F2GMMRHA2Q8vNdzAqmcENX0XyRTtOD8VHcPusFeZ3dGk6aH5MsVBDlyu5FMaYip3fOj1dowurttHcnOYcfT4_bVav5fr95W31uC41pSKVvFWEGgDeGWUFba0gnW60aEWtWO7U2hY6AUxRRQSAYrAQtu0aWwtOSV3P0d1x7y7439HEJHs_hiGflATThtWACcsudnTp4GMMxspdcD8qTBKwPLCSvTyxkgdWEojMrHJuecyZ_MLemSCjdmbQpnPB6CQ77_7Z8Ad4Z3WI</recordid><startdate>20180301</startdate><enddate>20180301</enddate><creator>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan</creator><creator>Persson, Lars</creator><creator>Tåg, Joacim</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Science Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20180301</creationdate><title>Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy</title><author>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan ; Persson, Lars ; Tåg, Joacim</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c449t-7ba24e117deaf94bf92dc8c9b93a59b94ffb1d915a4a2911a5169fbd8f3974233</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Acquisitions & mergers</topic><topic>Antitrust</topic><topic>Antitrust policy</topic><topic>Buyouts</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>Equity</topic><topic>M&As</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Mergers</topic><topic>Owners</topic><topic>Private equity</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Temporary ownership</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Persson, Lars</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tåg, Joacim</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Economics letters</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Norbäck, Pehr-Johan</au><au>Persson, Lars</au><au>Tåg, Joacim</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy</atitle><jtitle>Economics letters</jtitle><date>2018-03-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>164</volume><spage>31</spage><epage>34</epage><pages>31-34</pages><issn>0165-1765</issn><eissn>1873-7374</eissn><abstract>Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously privately unprofitable – but consumer surplus-enhancing – mergers now take place. We thus predict that merger waves among incumbents should follow the development of a local PE industry.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.027</doi><tpages>4</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext	fulltext
identifier	ISSN: 0165-1765
ispartof	Economics letters, 2018-03, Vol.164, p.31-34
issn	0165-1765 1873-7374
language	eng
recordid	cdi_proquest_journals_2048531025
source	Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete
subjects	Acquisitions & mergers Antitrust Antitrust policy Buyouts Companies Equity M&As Markets Mergers Owners Private equity Studies Temporary ownership
title	Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy
url	https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-14T19%3A43%3A25IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Threatening%20to%20buy:%20Private%20equity%20buyouts%20and%20antitrust%20policy&rft.jtitle=Economics%20letters&rft.au=Norb%C3%A4ck,%20Pehr-Johan&rft.date=2018-03-01&rft.volume=164&rft.spage=31&rft.epage=34&rft.pages=31-34&rft.issn=0165-1765&rft.eissn=1873-7374&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.027&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2048531025%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2048531025&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0165176517305220&rfr_iscdi=true