Threatening to buy: Private equity buyouts and antitrust policy
Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously p...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2018-03, Vol.164, p.31-34 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously privately unprofitable – but consumer surplus-enhancing – mergers now take place. We thus predict that merger waves among incumbents should follow the development of a local PE industry. |
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ISSN: | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.027 |