BANKRUPTCY AND DELINQUENCY IN A MODEL OF UNSECURED DEBT
This article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default. We observe that for individuals 60- 90 days late on payments, (i) 85% make payments during the next quarter, and (ii) 40% reduce their debt. To understand these facts, we develop a quantitative mo...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | International economic review (Philadelphia) 2018-05, Vol.59 (2), p.593-623 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | This article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default. We observe that for individuals 60- 90 days late on payments, (i) 85% make payments during the next quarter, and (ii) 40% reduce their debt. To understand these facts, we develop a quantitative model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers, typically offering partial debt forgiveness, instead of a blanket imposition of the "penalty rates" most unsecured credit contracts specify. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0020-6598 1468-2354 |
DOI: | 10.1111/iere.12281 |