Security analysis of efficient (Un-) fair non-repudiation protocols
An approach to protocol analysis using asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism verification tool (SHVT) is demonstrated on several variants of the well known Zhou–Gollmann fair non-repudiation protocol and on two more recent optimistic fair non-repudiation protocols. Attacks...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Formal aspects of computing 2005-10, Vol.17 (3), p.260-276 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | An approach to protocol analysis using asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism verification tool (SHVT) is demonstrated on several variants of the well known Zhou–Gollmann fair non-repudiation protocol and on two more recent optimistic fair non-repudiation protocols. Attacks on all these protocols are presented and an improved version of the Zhou–Gollmann protocol is proposed. |
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ISSN: | 0934-5043 1433-299X |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00165-004-0055-4 |