Spending Limitations, Agenda Controls and Voters' Expectations

Public choice theorists have begun to develop supply side models of the collective choice process that predict voter dissatisfaction with the size of government and the activities it undertakes. These models emphasize the imperfections and monopoly elements as opposed to traditional demand side mode...

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Veröffentlicht in:National tax journal 1979-06, Vol.32 (2), p.189
Hauptverfasser: Denzau, Arthur, Mackay, Robert, Weaver, Carolyn
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Public choice theorists have begun to develop supply side models of the collective choice process that predict voter dissatisfaction with the size of government and the activities it undertakes. These models emphasize the imperfections and monopoly elements as opposed to traditional demand side models where citizens control the political process. Thus, the proper way to analyze spending limitations may be in a framework where government has a form of monopoly power and participation in the political process is costly and limited so that government units are controlled by ''high demanders'' of the government's activities. These ''high demanders'' dominate the agenda formation process and advance their own interests subject only to a limited check by the electorate.Insights into the economics and politics of spending limits have been gained, such as: 1. Voter dissatisfaction with the size of government may be the result of the way the government budget is allocated. 2. dissatisfaction with government spending on one level may impact the size of other levels.
ISSN:0028-0283
1944-7477