US Bank Loan-Loss Provisions, Economic Conditions, and Regulatory Guidance
We differentiate fundamental and discretionary loan-loss provisioning by specifying a balance sheet perspective model with two bank-specific variables and one external economic variable. Based on panel data of US commercial banks between 1990 and 2000, we find that on average, US banks are rational;...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of applied finance : JAF 2006-04, Vol.16 (1), p.97 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | We differentiate fundamental and discretionary loan-loss provisioning by specifying a balance sheet perspective model with two bank-specific variables and one external economic variable. Based on panel data of US commercial banks between 1990 and 2000, we find that on average, US banks are rational; that is, loan-loss provisions reflect current and projected bank losses. Average-sized banks are more forward-looking (anti-procyclical), which some researchers interpret as income smoothing. The smallest banks and the very largest banks that are "too big to fail" are more backward-looking in provisioning, which some interpret as procyclical. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
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ISSN: | 1534-6668 |