Cyber Gray Space Deterrence

Andres cites that during the past few years, adversaries of the US have begun to use their militaries to test US resolve through innovative methods designed to bypass deterrent threats and avoid direct challenges. These "gray space campaigns" are specifically designed to allow adversaries to achieve their goals without triggering escalation by making retaliation difficult. China demonstrated this with its attempt to seize control of the South China Sea through its island building program, as did Russia with its effort to foment insurgency in eastern Ukraine through the use of "little green men." Cyberattacks often are less flamboyant than the physical campaigns in the South China Sea or Eastern Ukraine, but they may cause more damage to US economic and national security interests. Most work on cyber deterrence concludes by advocating better defenses--this is excellent advice, but has so far failed to do much to reduce losses. A bolder approach would be to address each of the psychological tactics attackers employ. What is needed are improved ways to attribute attacks; study the actual cost of attacks; raise public understanding of those costs that do not result in obvious kinetic destruction; develop deterrence policies that operate across election cycles; and expose adversary attempts to illegally (and legally) influence US domestic institutions. Such approaches would mark a departure from current policy but have the potential to undermine adversaries' psychological tactics and improve America's ability to deter cyberattacks.