Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment

Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment

This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of industry, competition and trade competition and trade, 2005-12, Vol.5 (3-4), p.231-234
1. Verfasser: Porter, Robert H.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Agreements
Cartels
Collusion
Communication
Competition
Compliance
Conspiracy
Economic policy
Game theory
Industrial economics
Participation
Payoffs
Prices
Profits
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Zusammenfassung:This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:1566-1679
1573-7012
DOI:10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8