Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth
We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that i...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Synthese (Dordrecht) 2018-03, Vol.195 (3), p.1065-1075 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the biconditionals of the form “‘A’ is true iff A.” |
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ISSN: | 0039-7857 1573-0964 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-017-1318-y |