Role of Chief Executive Officers in Takeover Resistance: Effects of CEO Incentives and Individual Characteristics

Role of Chief Executive Officers in Takeover Resistance: Effects of CEO Incentives and Individual Characteristics

This study examined the influence of chief executive officers' (CEO) incentives and individual characteristics on the likelihood that target firms will resist takeover attempts. Results showed that the greater the level of CEO stock ownership, the lower the likelihood of takeover resistance; ho...

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Veröffentlicht in:Academy of Management journal 1994-06, Vol.37 (3), p.554-579
Hauptverfasser: Buchholtz, Ann K., Ribbens, Barbara A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Anti takeover strategy
Bids
Business management
Business structures
Characteristics
Chief executive officers
Deferred compensation
Executive compensation
Factors
Financial management
Golden parachute
Golden parachutes
Impacts
Incentives
Investment strategies
Management principles
Risk aversion
Shareholders
Statistical analysis
Stock ownership
Stockholders
Studies
Tender offers
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This study examined the influence of chief executive officers' (CEO) incentives and individual characteristics on the likelihood that target firms will resist takeover attempts. Results showed that the greater the level of CEO stock ownership, the lower the likelihood of takeover resistance; however, neither the existence nor the magnitude of a CEO's "golden parachute" payment affected takeover resistance. Although CEO age had a curvilinear relationship with the likelihood of takeover resistance, CEO tenure was insignificant.
ISSN:0001-4273
1948-0989
DOI:10.5465/256700