Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution

Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution

According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assump...

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Veröffentlicht in:The British journal for the philosophy of science 2004-09, Vol.55 (3), p.545-560
1. Verfasser: Vranas, Peter B. M.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Ambivalence
Bayesian analysis
Belief
Cubes
Grandmothers
History of science and technology
Hypotheses
Inductive logic
Inference
Logic and calculus
Mathematical sciences and techniques
Paradoxes
Philosophy of science
Probability
Ravens
Reasoning
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container_title The British journal for the philosophy of science
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description According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption Attempts to defend the disputed assumption Attempts to refute the disputed assumption A way out for Bayesians Conclusion
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source Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects Ambivalence
Bayesian analysis
Belief
Cubes
Grandmothers
History of science and technology
Hypotheses
Inductive logic
Inference
Logic and calculus
Mathematical sciences and techniques
Paradoxes
Philosophy of science
Probability
Ravens
Reasoning
title Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
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