Accountability of senior compliance management for compliance failures in a credit institution

Purpose In most industries, legal entities of a certain size and complexity must have a compliance function. Such requirement is either set forth by regulatory law or the governance rules of the relevant organisation. In the highly regulated credit industry, the role and responsibilities of the compliance function are more precisely defined than in other industries. This paper aims to analyse the personal accountability of senior compliance officers in a bank’s compliance function when there is a failure of proper compliance. Design/methodology/approach This paper is based on a keynote addressed at Jesus College, University of Cambridge, 7 September 2016. The author approaches the issue of senior compliance management by analysing development of international financial regulation with respect to legal requirements for compliance function. Subsequently, the author determines what constitutes senior compliance management and applies the various legal regimes to situations of compliance failures. Findings While the accountability of the chief compliance officer and deputy for compliance failures is not set forth in regulatory law, courts and scholars have acknowledged such personal responsibility exists resorting to principles of civil law (contracts or torts), criminal law or employment law. Approaches and questions for this legal analysis are similar in a civil law as well as in common law jurisdiction. The most relevant breach of contract of the chief compliance officer will be an omission to act (forbearance), i.e. the failure to properly organize the compliance function and/or to immediately report a compliance risk to the board. Research limitations/implications Scholarly work in the law of compliance is still somewhat limited, thus the research also includes practitioners’ observations. The accountability of senior compliance management for compliance failures represents a growing trend in corporate governance to seek individual accountability for corporate misconduct; see, for example, US Department of Justice (DOJ) in its so-called Yates memorandum on “individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing”. Practical implications In incidents of non-compliance, banks and their compliance officers should be able to exculpate themselves if they can demonstrate proper organization of the compliance function. Originality/value The originality of this general review is to focus the analysis of accountability of senior compliance management on the credit indu