Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt Counter-Examples?

261In giving an account of the powers and capacities which an agent exercises in a Frankfurt example, it is perfectly reasonable to focus upon acting freely, and therefore upon what transpires in the actual sequence of events. [...]it is perfectly reasonable to factor out the role of any counterfactual intervention, since, in the actual sequence, the counterfactual causal variable is dormant. [...]it confirms that he acted freely, not that he had the freedom to act otherwise.In closing, I believe that Campbells account of alternate possibilities of action does not undermine Frankfurt counter-examples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. According to Fischer, an agent has guidance control (an agent acts freely) when she controls her behavior as it transpires in the actual causal sequence of events in which she acts. [...]I owe a special thanks to Joseph Campbell for the opportunity to consider such an interesting challenge to Frankfurt examples, and also for his thoughtful suggestion that I consider submitting this paper.REFERENCESCampbell, Joseph Kiem (1997): A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibility, Philosophical Studies.Fischer, John Martin (1994): The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control,Oxford: Blackwell.Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969): Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,Journal of Philosophy 66, 826839.