Group Intentions as Equilibria

Group Intentions as Equilibria

In this paper, we offer an analysis of 'group intentions.' On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophical studies 2007-03, Vol.133 (1), p.95-109
Hauptverfasser: Chant, Sara Rachel, Ernst, Zachary
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Beliefs
Bulletin boards
Collective action
Economics
Epistemology
Equilibrium
Evolution
Evolutionary epistemology
Evolutionary games
Game theory
Group mind
Intentionality
Morality
Nash equilibrium
Phenomenological research
Philosophical action theory
Philosophical analysis
Philosophy
Philosophy of action
Science
Social structure
Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we offer an analysis of 'group intentions.' On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-006-9008-5