Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a...

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Veröffentlicht in:Theory and decision 2017-12, Vol.83 (4), p.457-468
Hauptverfasser: Amir, Rabah, Belkov, Sergei, Evstigneev, Igor V.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.
ISSN:0040-5833
1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-017-9609-9