The rise and fall of the Merlin-Gerin Foundry Business: A case study in French corporate entrepreneurship

This case study discusses the history of the creation and development within an established French electrical firm of a new business, a high-tech foundry, by a dynamic entrepreneur. We follow the trajectory of this internal venture from launch to apogee, divestment, and closure over a period of 26 years. First, we outline a framework for the selection of the external and internal variables that will allow us to interpret the case within the present theories and practices of internal corporate venturing. This framework is also useful for analyzing some particular aspects that may be attributed to the specific culture and environment of the Merlin-Gerin company. Second, we present the case history, which can be summarized briefly as follows. In 1959, the foundry of Merlin-Gerin, a leading French manufacturer of electrical apparatus, could not compete with outside suppliers. Roger Huet, an expert in aluminum casting, was hired to revitalize the business with new technologies and develop the PRECIAL (PRECIsion ALuminum) process. In 1967, he was able to market low-weight, high-strength parts to European airplane manufacturers with sales reaching $10 million. In 1970, McKinsey recommended that scarce capital resources should be reserved for the core business and that the foundry should be sold. Amazingly, this decision was not implemented for 12 years, because Huet convinced management that the foundry was profitable and had a brilliant future thanks to its unique technological skills. The foundry was sold to Alcoa in 1982 and closed down in 1985. Table 1 highlights the main events and the key corporate and entrepreneurial actions and reactions that determined the evolution and the ultimate fate of the internal venture. Third, we discuss the key factors that contributed first to the success and then to the demise of the venture, such as the culture and climate of the Merlin-Gerin and the Alcoa companies, major changes in corporate strategy and policy, discontinuities and schisms in technology and market strategies, and the leading role of the entrepreneur. Fourth, we analyze, in retrospect, whether this internal venture made a contribution to the Merlin-Gerin Company and whether the 12-year delay in implementing the divestment recommendation by McKinsey was financially and socially justified. Finally, we compare the processes observed in this company with models of corporate entrepreneurship previously developed by scholars and draw conclusions about the critica