Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals

Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals

Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of finance (New York) 1990-12, Vol.45 (5), p.1627-1640
1. Verfasser: MCWILLIAMS, VICTORIA B.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Amendments
Anti takeover strategy
Business structures
Common stock
Effects
Ownership
Proposals
Proxy reporting
Proxy statements
Regression analysis
Shareholders
Shares
Shorter Papers
Stock exchanges
Stock prices
Stock shares
Studies
Voting
Voting rights
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.
ISSN:0022-1082
1540-6261
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03732.x