Energy Efficient Spectrum Auction Process with Utility Functions

The concept of green payments together with single and multiple bidding processes for short-term spectrum auctions are compared based on two reference cases: (1) when the users and the auctioneer are aware of the value of the reserve price, and (2) when the value of the reserve price is known only to the auctioneer. This involves a novel concept known as the green payment. This concept is combined with the use of probabilities to determine the users participating in the auction process. The purpose of the green payment and the probability is to help in reducing the amount of energy wasted as a result of the auction process. The utility of each user and that of the wireless service provider with and without the green payment is also examined. The revenue obtained from each of the examined models is also compared to determine which model is more profitable for the WSP. This paper shows that the use of multiple bidding process for short-term spectrum auctions gives a better performance measure when compared to the single bidding process, more particularly when the value of the reserve price is known to the auctioneer and the users in the system. It also shows that using the proposed probability equation in combination with the concept of the green payment helps in reducing the amount of energy consumed by the system.